

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O R 052030Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6637

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4201

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 9 USNATO 3764

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR MRN 3764 VICE 3749)

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JULY 4 REPORT TO NORTH ATLANTIC  
COUNCIL ON 1974 SUMMIT MEETING

REF: ROME 9313

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BEGIN SUMMARY: SECRETARY KISSINGER BRIEFED THE NORTH ATLANTIC  
COUNCIL ON THE RESULTS OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED U.S.-SOVIET  
SUMMIT IN A RESTRICTED MEETING OF THE NAC HELD ON JULY 4.  
EXPLAINING BACK GROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DOCUMENTS OF THE

MOSCOW SUMMIT, SECRETARY KISSINGER ENGAGED IN WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE WITH NATO AMBASSADORS AND SEVERAL HIGH OFFICIALS PRESENT FROM CAPITALS, INCLUDING BELGIAN FONMIN VAN ELSLANDE. THE SECRETARY ALSO SPOKE ABOUT U.S. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN IN VIEW OF HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO MADRID. ALLIES WERE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED AND SATISFIED WITH CONTENT AND TIMELINESS OF THE CONSULTATIONS. RESPONDING TO SECRETARY'S CALL FOR NON-THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF WHAT CSCE RESULTS WOULD JUSTIFY GOING TO FINAL STAGE OF CSCE, SYG LUNS EXPRESSED AGREEMENT IN HIS SUMMING-UP THAT NAC SHOULD NOW PROCEED WITH STUDY OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS. IN HIS SUMMATION, SYG ALSO NOTED FAVORABLY, AS HAD FONMIN VAN ELSLANDE EARLIER, SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS DESERVED SERIOUS STUDY IN ALLIANCE. LUNS SAID COUNCIL WILL AWAIT FURTHER SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.

1. SYG LUNS WELCOMED SECRETARY KISSINGER AND OTHER OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS INCLUDING BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VAN ELSLANDE, DANISH CSCE DEL AMBASSADOR MELLBIN, CANADIAN DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY RITCHIE, AND OTHERS. LUNS SKETCHED FORMAT FOR SESSION, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THERE WOULD BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR QUESTIONS. IN INTRODUCING THE SECRETARY, THE SYG EXPRESSED THE GRATIFICATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR THIS CONSULTATION WHICH HE REGARDED AS A FURTHER MANIFESTATION OF ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO STRENGTHEN CONSULTATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN THE RECENT ATLANTIC DECLARATION.

2. THE SECRETARY INDICATED HE WISHED TO BEGIN WITH A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. PERCEPTION OF THE SUMMIT, TO BE FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSION WITH THE COUNCIL. HE SAID HE WISHED TO SPEND ABOUT TEN MINUTES AT THE END OF THE SESSION DISCUSSING U.S. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN. SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE STOPPING IN SPAIN NEXT WEEK, AND, IN THE SPIRIT OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, HE WISHED TO GIVE HIS COLEAGUES SOME OUTLINE OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH U.S.-SPANISH RELATIONS ARE GOING.

3. CONCERNING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY REFERRING TO HIS STATEMENTS TO THE COUNCIL AT THE PRIVATE MEETING IN OTTAWA  
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ABOUT U.S. PURPOSES AND U.S. THOUGHTS AS TO WHAT WAS FORESEEABLE. HE SAID THE ALLIES COULD MEASURE FOR THEMSELVES THE RESULTS IN MOSCOW AGAINST THE PREDICTIONS HE HAD MADE IN OTTAWA. SPECIFICALLY HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD THREE GENERAL PURPOSES IN MIND IN GOING TO MOSCOW: A) A GENERAL REVIEW WITH THE SOVIETS OF THE WORLD SITUATION

SO THAT TENSIONS DO NOT ARISE AS A RESULT OF MISCALCULATION OR MISUNDERSTANDING, AND TO IDENTIFY AREAS WHERE PERHAPS TENSIONS MIGHT BE EASED BY CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH,

AFTER ALL, HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESTROY HUMANITY; B) A REVIEW OF THE ARMS RACE, SPECIFICALLY TO SEE IN WHAT AREAS THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION CAN AGREE ON LIMITATIONS OF THE ARMS RACE AND TO

SEE TO WHAT EXTENT THEY CAN PREVENT TECHNOLOGY FROM RUNNING AWAY WITH THEIR POLITICAL DECISIONS; IN OTHER WORDS, HOW TO AVOID A PURE SECURITY APPROACH TO ALL OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS; AND C) AN ATTEMPT TO FIND AREAS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION SO AS TO STRENGTHEN THE NETWORK OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS WHICH GIVES TO BOTH COUNTRIES AN INCENTIVE FOR MODERATION AND RESTRAINT IN TIMES OF CRISES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IN VARIOUS WAYS THOSE THREE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN MET.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID FRANKLY THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE AMBIVALENT ON THE SUBJECT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE PRESENT WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION CAME INTO OFFICE IN 1969 AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD THE REPUTATION OF BEING A HARDLINER, EVERY EUROPEAN LEADER WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES PLEADED WITH US TO ADOPT A MORE CONCILIATORY LINE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN THE U.S. DOES ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THERE IS ALWAYS THE FEAR THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS MIGHT REACH THE STATE OF CONDOMINIUM. SO, ON THE ONE HAND OUR ALLIES URGE AN EASING OF TENSIONS BUT ON THE OTHER THEY ARE UNEASY ABOUT THE STEPS THAT WILL LEAD TO THE EASING OF THEM. THE SECRETARY SAID THERE IS NO REMEDY FOR THIS, EXCEPT THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION BY THE U.S. SO THAT THE ALLIES WILL UNDERSTAND U.S. PERCEPTIONS. ALSO, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS EMBARKED.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W  
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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6638

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4202

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACL ANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

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5. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT THE PERIOD OF DETENTE IS SO TAKE  
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FOR GRANTED IN ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES THAT ON THE ONE HAND OUR  
PUBLICS WANT THE BENEFITS OF PEACE AND ON THE OTHER HAND THEY WANT  
THE BENEFITS OF STRIDENT ANTI-COMMUNISM BOTH AT THE SAME TIME.  
THEREFORE THE LEFT IS BEING QUIET BECAUSE THERE IS DETENTE AND GOV-  
ERNMENTS ATTEMPT TO PLACATE THE RIGHT BY TAKING TOUGH POSITIONS. IN  
ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES THERE IS A CONFUSED DOMESTIC DEBATE WHICH GIVES  
THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN PROLONGED CRISIS IS  
GREATER THAN IT REALLY IS. THE U.S. INTENT, HOWEVER, IS TO MAKE  
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CLEAR THAT IN THE EVENT THERE IS A CRISIS IT WILL BE THE RESULT OF A  
CLEAR SOVIET PROVOCATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE. IN THE THREE YEAR  
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OF DETENTE, THE SECRETARY RECALLED, THE U.S. HAS NOT GIVEN UP ONE  
POSITION OF SUBSTANCE.

6. THE SECRETARY THEN PROCEEDED TO DETAIL WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED  
IN MOSCOW. TO PUT HIS REMARKS IN GENERAL CONTEXT, HE CALLED TO THE  
ATTENTION OF THE ALLIES THE POLITICAL DEBATE WHICH IS RAGING IN THE

UNITED STATES, A DEBATE IN WHICH IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHETHER  
THE PROTAGONISTS ARE MORE AFRAID OF FAILURE OR SUCCESS IN U.S.  
DIPLOMACY, TO THE POINT THAT ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION FROM READING  
OUR NEWSPAPERS THAT ALMOST NOTHING THE U.S. HAS ACHIEVED IN MOSCOW  
IS OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SECRETARY WISHED  
TO POINT OUT THAT AS THESE U.S.-USSR SUMMITS CONTINUE, THEY CANNOT  
MAKE THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL ACHIEVEMENTS THAT THEY MADE IN THE  
BEGINNING WHICH WAS MARKED BY A COMPLETE TURN IN ORIENTATION.  
THE WORST MISTAKE WE COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO LET OURSELVES BE TRAPPED  
BY PUBLICITY INTO CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT EVERY TIME THE  
PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV MEET THERE WILL BE WORLD-SHAKING OCCURRENCES.  
INDEED, TO THE EXTENT WE CREATE THAT IMPRESSION WE CREATE MAXIMUM  
INSTABILITY IN PUBLIC OPINION AND MAXIMUM INSTABILITY IN OUR  
RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE ONLY SO MANY WORLD-SHAKING THINGS ONE  
CAN AGREE TO. MR. KISSINGER SAID THE MERE FACT THAT WE HAD A  
SUMMIT IN THIS ATMOSPHERE AND IN THE FACE OF THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES  
TO WHICH WE ARE EXPOSED AND THE TEMPTATIONS THAT THE ASSAULT ON  
CENTRAL AUTHORITY MUST ENTAIL, IS IN ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY EVENT.  
THE FACT THAT ALL THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET POLITBUREAU, OSTEN-  
TIOUSLY IN FRONT OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND THE PRESS INSISTED ON  
MAINTAINING A PERIOD OF DETENTE WITH THE U.S. IS IN ITSELF A POLITICA  
L

FACT WHICH IS NOT WITHOUT ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

7. REFERRING TO THE GENERAL REVIEW WITH THE SOVIETS OF THE WORLD SITUATION, THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS REALLY VERY LITTLE THAT OCCURRED THAT WAS NOT COVERED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST, HE NOTED THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY TO THE ALLIES IN WASHINGTON AND IN OTTAWA, AND THE PRESIDENT ALSO DID SO IN BRUSSELS LAST WEEK. NOTING THAT WHILE THE  
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UNITED STATES HAS NO OVERWHELMING INCENTIVE TO EXAGGERATE THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HE STATED THAT WITH REGARD TO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON THAT AREA, THERE WAS REALLY LESS IN FACT THAN MEETS THE EYE IN THE COMMUNIQUE. NOTING THE COMMUNIQUE STATES THAT THE U.S. AND USSR CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST RESUME ITS WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT'S ALL THERE WAS TO IT, THE PARTIES DID NOT DEFINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." GENERALLY SPEAKING, THERE WAS NOTHING THAT OCCURRED IN MOSCOW WHICH WOULD ADD TO WHAT THE U.S. HAS ALREADY TOLD THE ALLIES ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FACT IS THAT WHILE WE BELIEVE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE CAN PLAY A CERTAIN ROLE, THE REAL DECISIONS WILL BE MADE EITHER ON THE FRINGES OF THE CONFERENCE OR IN DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN THE LIGHT OF PUBLICITY. WE WANT SOVIET COOPERATION IN PURSUIT OF A MODERATE COURSE AND WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO BACK RADICAL ARAB ELEMENTS AND COOPERATE WITH THEM, OR IF THEY DO WE WILL PRODUCE A STALEMATE.

8. REGARDING EUROPE, THE SECRETARY SAID FIRST, IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS RIGHT NOW ON MBFR. ON CSCE, MR. KISSINGER SAID THE SOVIETS PRESSED US VERY HARD FOR CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT PHASE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND FOR A CSCE SUMMIT. HE SAID THE U.S. VIEW IS AS RELATED TO THE ALLIES PREVIOUSLY. ESSENTIALLY THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS: A) DOES ANY RESULT NOW FORESEEABLE JUSTIFY A SUMMIT? AND B) IF THE ANSWER TO (A) IS AFFIRMATIVE, WHAT WOULD BE THAT RESULT?

9. THE SECRETARY WISHED TO EMPHASIZE TWO THINGS. FIRST, THE UNITED STATES HAS NO AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO PRODUCE A CSCE SUMMIT. SECONDLY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO REMOVE THE WHOLE DEBATE WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT APPROACH TO CSCE FROM THE LEVEL OF THEOLOGY. TO DO SO, HE SAID, WE SHOULD SEEK ANSWERS TOGETHER TO THE TWO QUESTIONS HE OUTLINED ABOVE. HE SAID THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ITS ALLIES. THE QUESTION IS, CAN WE TOGETHER SET DOWN A LIST OF EIGHT OR TEN THINGS WE CAN AGREE UPON WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS READY TO WORK WITH ITS ALLIES, THE U.S. WOULD NOT PRESS ITS ALLIES EITHER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE OUTCOME OR ON THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE OUTCOME SHOULD BE REACHED. IN TURN THE U.S. DID NOT WANT TO BE PRESSED EITHER. IN SUM, HE SAID, IT  
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IS NOW UP TO THE ALLIES TO CLARIFY THEIR OWN POSITION IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. HE INTENDED TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT IN FURTHER DETAIL WITH THE ALLIES HE WILL BE SEEING BILATERALLY LATER DURING HIS PRESENT EUROPEAN TRIP.

10. THE SECRETARY REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOWED SOME CONCERN REGARDING BERLIN. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN DETAIL WITH THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON JULY 3. THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXERT VERY HIGH PRESSURE ON THIS MATTER BUT IT WAS NEVERTHELESS A POINT THEY CLEARLY MADE.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6639

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4203

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDELM MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 9 USNATO 3764

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR MRN 3764 VICE 3749)

11. REFERRING TO U.S.-USSR BILATERAL SUBJECTS, THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS VERY LITTLE HE COULD ADD TO WHAT WAS IN THE COMMUNIQUE. RECALLING HIS POINT ABOUT U.S. INTENT IN ESTABLISHING A NETWORK OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, THE SECRETARY REPORTED THAT USEFUL

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.

12. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL, MR. KISSINGER RECALLED HE HAD EMPHASIZED IN OTTAWA AND THE PRESEIDENT HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE ALLIES LAST WEEK THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO MAKING PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL. EXPLAINING  
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THIS CONCERN, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT NO ONE CAN DEMONSTRATE FROM HISTORY THAT ARMS RACES THEMSELVES PRODUCE WARS, NEVERTHELESS THEY DO CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF INSECURITY WITHIN WHICH POLITICAL CONFLICTS CAN TAKE ON A SHARPNESS WHICH BECOMES UNCONTROLABLE. ANY STUDENT OF WORLD WAR I HAS LEARNED THAT THE OUTBREAK IN 1914 WAS AS MUCH DUE TO MOBILIZATION SCHEDULES AND MILITARY PLANS AS IT WAS TO SPECIFIC POLITICAL EVENTS. ON JULY 20, 1914 NOT ONE EUROPEAN LEADER EXCEPT PERHAPS THE AUSTRIANS THOUGHT THAT BY AUGUST 1 THERE WOULD BE GENERAL WAR. FOR THAT TEN DAY PERIOD, AT LEAST, MILITARY DECISIONS RAN AWAY WITH POLITICAL DECISIONS. THE U.S. DID NOT WANT MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO DRIVE US INTO DECISIONS THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE FOR POLITICAL REASONS. ON THE ONE HAND, IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID NAIVETY BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID BEING IRRESPONSIBLE AND ALLOWING PURE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

DRIVE US INTO CONFRONTATIONS THAT WILL HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES.

13. TURNING TO SALT, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT, IF NECESSARY, THE UNITED STATES IS PERFECTLY PREPARED TO CONDUCT AN ARMS RACE TO

PROTECT U.S. SECURITY. NO AMERICAN PRESIDENT WILL AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THIS ADMINISTRATION PERMIT THE U.S. TO FALL BEHIND IN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. BUT, GIVEN THE STATE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY, SIMPLY TO LET AN ARMS RACE RUN UNCONSTRAINED HAS PROFOUND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES BECAUSE THE ONLY WAY TO JUSTIFY IT IS BY EMPHASIZING A KIND OF THREAT FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT IN TURN BECOMES INCONSISTENT WITH RELAXATION, BECAUSE WE CANNOT HAVE AT THE SAME TIME MAXIMUM PREPAREDNESS AND A MAXIMUM STATE OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. MR. KISSINGER NOTED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FACE OF THIS SAME DILEMMA.

14. REGARDING THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS MADE, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THEY WERE THREE IN NUMBER PLUS TWO IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS. THE TWO IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS HE THOUGHT MARKED THE FIRST TIME IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THAT SECRET AGREEMENTS WERE PUBLICLY SIGNED. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT HAVE AN ADVANTAGE SINCE IT IS AUTOMATIC IN  
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THE UNITED STATES THAT SECRET AGREEMENTS SECRETLY SIGNED ARE

ALWAYS MADE PUBLIC. PERHAPS THIS NEW FORMAT MAY BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY.

15. THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT THE 1972 AGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS IN DEFENSIVE ARMS PERMITTED EACH SIDE TO HAVE TWO ABM SITES, ONE AT THE CAPITAL AND ONE AT AN ICBM FIELD. THESE TWO COULD BE NO CLOSER THAN 1300 KM TO EACH OTHER. TO DATE, HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO BUILDING ONLY ONE OF THESE TWO ABM SITES. AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, HE SAID, WE AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD PRECLUDE THEMSELVES FROM BUILDING THE OTHER ABM SITE. BUT, IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY POTENTIAL ASYMMETRY DEVELOPING FROM THE ORIGINAL CHOICE WHICH WAS MADE ON THE ORIGINAL ASSUMPTION OF TWO ABM SITES, EACH SIDE HAS THE OPTION TO TRANSFER ITS SITE FROM ITS PRESENT LOCATION TO THE FORMERLY AUTHORIZED ALTERNATIVE LOCATION AT THE FIVE-YEAR REVIEW POINT ONCE DURING THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS OPTION ONCE EXERCISED CANNOT BE EXERCISED AGAIN.

16. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS THAT IT FURTHER STRENGTHENS THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES NOT TO DEPLOY AN ABM DEFENSE THAT IS STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT, AND THEREFORE EACH SIDE REMAINS VULNERABLE TO THE OTHER. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE U.S. DEPLOYED MIRV WARHEADS IT DID SO, IN PART, IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE FORCAST ABM DEFENSES OF THE OTHER SIDE. WITH THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. NOW HAS THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAT WERE MEANT TO BE USED UP IN FIGHTING THROUGH THE DEFENSE. NOW THEY GET A FREE RIDE.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W  
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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6640  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4204  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACLANT  
USMISSION GENEVA



AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USMISSION USUN NY

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR MRN 3764 VICE 3749)

17. THE SECOND AGREEMENT WAS THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN(TTB), UNDER WHICH NEITHER COUNTRY WOULD CARRY OUT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS ABOVE A YIELD OF 150 KT, EXCEPT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNE'S), WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL MONITORING PROVISIONS. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD INCLUDE, AMONG OTHER THING, PRECISE SPECIFICATION OF THE TIME AND LOCATION OF THE SHOT; AND, WHEN THE SHOT IS ABOVE 150 KT, INVITING OBSERVERS. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PERMITTED. THESE STIUPATIONS WERE NOT IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, BUT THERE IS AN  
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UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL BE IN THE PNE AGREEMENT. EXACTLY WHAT THE OBSERVERS WOULD DO HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED, AND THIS COULD PRODUCE GREAT PROBLEMS.

18. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR WHAT THE TTB DOES NOT DO. IT DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAIN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT GENERATION OF WARHEADS FOR MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH EACH SIDE HAS TESTED. FOR A NEW GENERATION OF SYSTEMS, HOWEVER, THE TTB WILL PRECLUDE TESTS TO IMPROVE DESIGN AND TO INCREASE THE YIELD-TO-WEIGHT RATION SO AS TO PERMIT THE SMALLER PACKAGING OF AN EQUIVALENT YIELD, AND

THEREFORE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL WARHEADS FOR THE SAME PAYLOAD. HE BELIEVED SOME CONCERN EXPRESSED ABOUT THROW-WEIGHT IN THE PRESENT GENERATION OF SOVIET MISSILES IS WRONG. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS COULD BE TURNED INTO A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE WITH PRESENT SYSTEMS, AND WITH FORESEEABLE WARHEAD NUMBERS. IF THE IMPROVED PACKAGING CONTINUES AND NUMBER OF WARHEADS CAN BE INCREASED GEOMETRICALLY, A PROBLEM COULD ARISE. THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE TTB WILL OPERATE FOR BOTH SIDES TO PREVENT OR AT LEAST SLOW DOWN THE ELABORATION OF A GAP THAT MIGHT APPEAR BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD CREATE THE TYPE OF SITUATION WHERE THE ADVANTAGE OF PREEMPTION IS GREAT, AS BEFORE WORLD WAR I.

19. THE THIRD AREA OF AGREEMENT WAS THE UNDERSTANDING TO START TALKING ABOUT INVIRONMENTAL WARFARE. THE U.S. DOES NOT YET FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS IN THIS FIELD, BUT WILL KEEP THE NAC INFORMED OF WHAT WE INTEND TO DO AND OF U.S. PERCEPTIONS. AT THE MOMENT THESE ARE NOT VERY PROFOUND.

20. KISSINGER THEN TURNED TO THE TWO PROTOCOLS WORKED OUT BY THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND SIGNED IN MOSCOW. THESE HAD

BEEN THE SUBJECTS OF INTENSE DEBATE IN THE U.S. THEY CONCERN DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENTS. UNDER THE ABM AGREEMENT, THE U.S. HAD HAD TO DISMANTLE SOME ABM LAUNCHERS AT MALMSTROM AFB; THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO HAD TO DISMANTLE 15 ABM LAUNCHERS AT TEST SITES.

21. FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS THERE WERE COMPLEX PROBLEMS OF WORKING OUT HOW THE 210 OLDER SOVIET SS7'S AND SS8' COULD BE TRADED IN AGAINST NEW SSBN LAUNCHERS.

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THERE WAS ALSO A QUESTION OF DISMANTLING MISSILES ON OLDER SUBMARINES, WHICH SENATOR JACKSON HAD RECENTLY TALKED ABOUT. IT WAS WRONG TO CALL THIS A QUESTION OF LOOPHOLES. THE REASON WHY PRECISE PROVISIONS FOR DISMANTLEMENT WERE NOT WRITTEN INTO THE I.A. WAS THAT THEY WERE TOO COMPLICATED AND WOULD HAVE TAKEN FIVE MORE YEARS TO NEGOTIATE, AND WERE LEFT TO THE SCC.

22. THESE AGREEMENTS WORKED OUT BY THE SCC HAD BEEN KEPT SECRET BECAUSE THE SOVIETS DID NOT WISH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO BE PUBLISHED. WE INTEND TO SUBMIT THESE AGREEMENTS TO THE CONGRESS. HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT INNOVATIONS; THEY ARE ENTIRELY TECHNICAL. WE CAN SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THEM IF THE ALLIES WISH TECHNICAL DETAILS.

23. TURNING TO A GENERAL SALT ISSUE THAT INVOLVES THE ALLIANCE, THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT ALLIED TERRITORY HAD BEEN PROTECTED FOR A LONG TIME BY U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. ALLIES SHOULD NOT MAKE HASTY POLITICAL JUDGMENTS AS RESULT OF THE CURRENT DEBATE IN U.S. ABOUT LOSS OF SUPERIORITY, WHICH IS A MATTER OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. THE

INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES NOT RENDER THE U.S. INFERIOR. THE SOVIETS DO HAVE SEVERAL HUNDRED MORE MISSILES THAN WE DO, BUT WE HAD DECIDED LONG BEFORE THE SALT AGREEMENT NOT TO TRY TO MATCH THEM IN SHEER NUMBERS. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT DID NOT PUT A HALT TO ANY U.S. ONGOING PROGRAM; SOME WERE IN FACT ACCELERATED. IT MAY HAVE STOPPED AND PROBABLY DID DELAY CERTAIN SOVIET PROGRAMS. GRANTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE MISSILES THAN WE DO, THE U.S. HAS THE STRATEGIC AIR BOMBERS, WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE I.A. IT ALSO HAS OVERSEAS BASES, WHICH WE ARE NOT COUNTING IN SALT, FOR REASONS OF ALLIANCE COHESION, BUT THE SOVIETS ARE CERTAINLY NOT IGNORING THEM (AT LEAST HE HOPED THEY WERE NOT IGNORING THEM, OR ELSE ONE WOULD WONDER WHAT NATO WAS DOING).

24. BY ANOTHER CRITERION, MOREOVER, THE U.S. HAD NOT ONLY MAINTAINED BUT INCREASED ITS SUPERIORITY. FROM A TWO-TO-ONE U.S./SOVIET RATIO IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN 1972, WE HAD GONE TO A THREE-TO-ONE RATIO TODAY, WHICH WOULD BE FOUR-TO-ONE IF LAUNCHERS AT OVERSEAS BASES WERE INCLUDED. IF THE U.S. STOPPED DEPLOYING MIRVS TOMORROW, THE SOVIETS WOULD STILL NOT CATCH UP IN NUMBERS OF WARHEADS UNTIL 1980. IF WE CONTINUE DEPLOYING AT THE CURRENT REASONABLE RATE, THERE IS NO WAY THE SOVIETS CAN CATCH UP FOR 10 YEARS. IF

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NECESSARY, WE COULD ALSO DEPLOY LARGER MISSILES IN CURRENT HOLES TO ACHIEVE GREATER TOTAL THROW-WEIGHT.

25. THE DIFFICULTY IS, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, THAT THE U.S. SUPERIORITY IN WARHEADS BECOMES LESS AND LESS SIGNIFICANT AS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WARHEADS INCREASES. THE SITUATION WILL ARISE NOT WHEN THE U.S. IS INFERIOR, BUT WHEN OUR SUPERIORITY NO LONGER CAN EASILY BE TRANSLATED INTO EITHER A MILITARY OR, CONSEQUENTLY, A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. THIS IS WHY THE ROLE OF LOCAL DEFENSES HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT. WE MUST NOT FALL BACK TO THE THINKING OF THE 1950'S, WHEN WE NEGLECTED TACTICAL FORCES BECAUSE WE HAD TALKED OURSELVES INTO THINKING WE WERE STRATEGICALLY INFERIOR AND HAD TO MAKE UP THE GAP.

26. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE QUESTION OF SUPERIORITY IS A COMPLEX MATTER THAT WARRANTS MORE DETAILED TREATMENT AND NOT JUST A NUMERICAL ONE. HE PROPOSED A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT AMONG THE ALLIES. BUT THE STARTING POINT SHOULD BE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS NOT JUST NUMBERS THAT DETERMINE RELATIVE SUPERIORITY, BUT A COMBINATION OF NUMBERS WITH THROW-WEIGHT AND ACCURACY.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6641

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4205

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACL ANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

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EXDIS

27. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. CAN STAY AHEAD EVEN WITHIN THESE PARAMETERS, WHAT CONCERNS US NOW IS THE OPENING GAP BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITIES. THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND, UNLIKE THE OFFENSE, IS DETERMINED BY NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS, NOT NUMBERS OF WARHEADS. MOREOVER, EACH SIDE PUBLISHES WHAT IT IS DOING, WHICH IN ITSELF IS AN OBSTACLE TO RELAXATION. THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES IS LOW AND CONTINUING TO DECLINE. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT THAT CAN BE ALERTED, WHICH ARE VISIBLE AND THEREFORE, POLITICALLY USEFUL, AS OPPOSED TO MISSILES STUCK IN THE GROUND.

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28. KISSINGER OUTLINED THE VARIOUS CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD DETER A FIRST STRIKE. BEFORE ANY POLITICAL LEADER WOULD AGREE TO SUCH AN ACTION, HE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO BE CONVINCED BY A MILITARY LEADER THAT 500 MISSILES COULD BE FIRED AT THE SAME TIME, INSTEAD OF JUST FIVE, WHICH IS THE MAXIMUM THAT HAVE BEEN TESTED CONCURRENTLY; THAT THE MISSILES WOULD BE ACCURATE IF FIRED IN A NORTH-SOUTH TRAJECTORY INSTEAD OF THE EAST-WEST ONE THEY WERE TESTED IN; THAT THEIR EFFECTS AGAINST A SILO WOULD BE WHAT SHOWS IN UNTESTED PAPER CALCULATIONS; THAT THE OPPONENT WOULD NOT LAUNCH ON WARNING AND THAT THE OPPONENT'S REMAINING FORCES WOULD NOT DESTROY THE LEADER'S COUNTRY. THERE SHOULD BE A SERIOUS DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT WITHIN EACH COUNTRY, AS WELL AS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

29. WITH REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF SALT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ALLIES IN OTTAWA THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SLIGHTLY MORE LAUNCHERS THAN THE U.S. FOR THE FIVE YEARS OF

THE I.A. (ALTHOUGH THE U.S. CAN CLOSE THE GAP IF IT EVENTUALLY DEPLOYS THE MISSILES IT HAS IN DEVELOPMENT) AND THE U.S. HAS INCOMPARABLY MORE WARHEADS. WE HAD HOPED TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT RECOGNIZING THESE ASYMMETRIES, ALLOWING THE U.S. TO RETAIN MORE WARHEADS, AND THE SOVIETS TO RETAIN A GREATER NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EFFECTED BY EXTENDING THE I.A. BY TWO OR THREE YEARS. THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WE COULD NOT COME TO AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBERS. THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO GIVE SOME ADVANTAGE TO US IN THE NUMBER OF MIRVED VEHICLES, BUT THE LIMITS THEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT WERE NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE THOUGHT THEY WERE BUILDING ANYWAY, AND WE WERE NOT PREPARED MERELY TO RATIFY THEIR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS.

30. THE U.S. SIDE HAD HELD A FRANK AND VERY DETAILED DISCUSSION

OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY THREAT TO THEM, AND WE HAD CHECKED SOVIET VIEWS WITH U.S. EXPERTS. THEY PROVED PLAUSIBLE, IF IT WERE TO BE ASSUMED THAT THE U.S. WOULD STRIKE FIRST (AND THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THIS ASSUMPTION FOR ANY ATTACK ON NATO IN EUROPE). WE ARE ACCUSTOMED IN OUR ANALYSES TO COUNTING ONLY WHAT WE HAVE LEFT AFTER A FIRST STRIKE BY THE OTHER SIDE, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE THE SAME. THE RESULT OF ANALYSES AFTER A FIRST STRIKE SHOW THAT IF YOU HAVE TO CHOOSE MILITARY ESTABLISH-  
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MENTS, YOU WOULD NOT NECESSARILY CHOOSE THE SOVIET SIDE.

31. TURNING BACK TO IMMEDIATE SALT ISSUES, KISSINGER PROJECTED THAT CURRENT U.S. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WOULD CALL FOR A LARGE INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS IN 1978-79. SOVIET MIRV DEPLOYMENTS WOULD ALSO COME TO A HEAD IN THE 1978-79 TIME FRAME; AT ANYRATE, WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO DEPLOY VERY MUCH FOR THE NEXT 18 MONTHS. BY 1978-79, AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR I.A., THE U.S. AND USSR WILL BOTH BE POTENTIALLY ON THE EDGE OF A PERIOD OF VAST INCREASES IN THEIR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES. FOR THIS REASON, THE IDEA OF STRECHING OUT THE AGREEMENT OVER TIME, SO AS TO LOWER THE DEPLOYMENT RATE, HAD SEEMED TO HAVE MERIT. THIS IS WHY WE DROPPED THE IDEA OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, ON THE ONE HAND, WHICH WULD HAVE SO MANY UNCERTAINTIES OF TECHNOLOGY AND HAVE TO HAVE SO MANY HEDGES BUILT INTO IT; AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FIVE-YAR SPAN OF THE CURRENT AGREEMENT, WHICH SEEMED TOO SHORT. THE U.S. SIDE NOW BELIEVES A 10-YEAR APPROACH MIGHT BE THE BEST TIMEFRAME TO TEST SOVIET INTENTIONS.

32. IF WE CANNOT REACH AN AGREEMENT, THE U.S. HAS CONTINUED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WILL CONTINUE OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS. WE THINK WE NOW HAVE A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH, WITHIN 6 TO 9 MONTHS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TELL HOW SERIOUS THE SOVIETS ARE IN THIS FIELD. IN THIS REGARD, THE MOSCOW TALKS WERE OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE, NOT JUST FOR WHAT WE LEARNED ABOUT OUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SURPRISIG EXCHANGES OF STRATEGIC ISSUES WITH A POTENTIAL ENEMY. WE DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY PEOPLE WERE EXPECTING TO REACH STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY.

33. IN GENERAL, A BASIC PROBLEM REMAINS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SEEK THE ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE WITHOUT THE SUBSTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING AND REGULARIZATION OF ANNUAL SUMMIT MEETINGS SERVES AS A SIGNIFICANT RESTRAINT ON SOVIET BELLICOSITY. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BRINGING ABOUT THIS SITUATION IS WESTERN UNITY. SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID ONE REASON FOR HIS VISIT TO BRUSSELS WAS TO MAKE SURE WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. NAC DEBATE AFFECTS PERCEPTIONS OF ALL AS TO WHAT COMMON SECURITY IS. CONCLUDING HIS OPENING REMARKS, THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION.

34. VAN ELSLANDE (BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER) THANKED THE  
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SECRETARY FOR HIS COMPLETE PRESENTATION WHICH CONTAINED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING DETAILS. HE FURTHER THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR CONSULTING WITH THE ALLIES SO PROMPTLY AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. VAN ELSLANDE SAID HE WAS THANKFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S CLARIFICATION ON CSCE SINCE, AT THE TIME HE READ THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, HE HAD THE "NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY" IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. FELT THAT A CONCLUSION TO CSCE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IMMEDIATELY. HE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NOW PUT CSCE BACK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OTTAWA DISCUSSIONS. HE NOTED THAT PROBLEMS REMAINED TO BE SOLVED BEFORE THERE COULD BE A CONCLUSION TO STAGE II. VAN ELSLANDE ASKED THE SECRETARY IF HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD UP DURING A PERIOD THIS SUMMER WHILE THE ALLIES UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO A RESUMPTION, NEXT SEPTEMBER. IN RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GERMANS, VAN ELSLANDE HAD LEARNED OF POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET MBFR PROPOSALS. HE ASKED IF THE SECRETARY KNEW OF THESE AND WHAT THEY MIGHT MEAN FOR THE FUTURE. VAN ELSLANDE DESCRIBED FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON SALT AS VITAL FOR THE ALLIANCE. HE WAS GRATEFUL THAT THE SECRETARY HAD GONE INTO THE UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY INVOLVED IN ARMS LIMITATIONS AS WELL AS INTO THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC FACTORS. HE HOPED THE ALLIANCE COULD CONSULT FURTHER ON THESE MATTERS WITH, OF COURSE, THE PROPER GUARANTEES FOR SECRECY.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6642

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4206

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USMISSION USUN NY

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EXDIS

35. RESPONDING TO VAN ELSLANDE'S QUESTION ON CSCE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS AS HE HAD OUTLINED IT BEFORE, AND REMAINED AS OUTLINED, REGARDLESS OF POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE. THE SECRETARY UGED THAT THE ALLIES CONSULT IMMEDIATELY ON WHAT WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION TO THE CSCE. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS CONTINUING AFTER JULY, AND DID NOT FORESEE THAT AN AGREEMENT IN CSCE COULD BE REACHED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. HE ADVISED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY RECESS BE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE GREATEST DISCRETION IN AN UNPROVOCATIVE WAY AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOLIDAY WHICH IS NORMAL FOR AUGUST. WITH REGARD TO CSCE  
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NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE SECRETARY URGED THAT THE ALLIES MOVE FROM THE PRESENT "BUREAUCRATIC" APPROACH, IN WHICH EVERY COUNTRY HAS A "SHOPPING LIST" OF WHAT IT WANTS OUT OF BASKET III, AND INTO DISCUSSION OF THE 6,8 OR 12 ITEMS WHICH CAN BE AGREED UPON AS ESSENTIAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE DEFINITION OF THESE ESSENTIAL ITEMS BE UNDERTAKEN NOW IN CONSULTATIONS IN NATO, IN GENEVA OR IN BOTH PLACES. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO TURN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS INTO A DRAFTING EXERCISE. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN OF OBSTRUCTIONISM. THE ALLIES SHOULD DEFINE WHAT THEY ARE AFTER AND STICK TO IT. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT PUSH BEYOND THE ALLIED CONSENSUS ON CSCE, JUST AS IT HOPED NOT TO BE PUSHED ON CSCE OUTCOMES.

36. WITH REGARD TO VAN ELSLANDE'S QUESTION ON STRATEGIC ARMS, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD KEPT THE COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED. WE WOULD BE PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO WORK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DEVELOP A FORUM FOR PUTTING THE BASES OF U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING BEFORE THE ALLIES.

37. WITH REGARD TO MBFR THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID IN MOSCOW WHICH WENT BEYOND KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED IN VIENNA, AND HE NOTED THE SOVIETS SEEMED RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN BEYOND THAT POINT. THERE HAD BEEN A VERBATIM REPETITION OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD SAID IN VIENNA AND THEY COULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE SECRETARY'S IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY KNOW WHAT CSCE DOES.

38. KRAPF (FRG PERMREP) THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS PRESENTATION TO THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. HE ADDED THAT THE SUMMIT PREVIEW GIVEN AT

OTTAWA AND IN THE JUNE 26 CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING HAD PREPARED THE ALLIANCE FOR THE MOSCOW MEETING AND THERE HAD BEEN NO SURPRISES. KRAPF SAID THAT IN LOOKING AT THE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS RESULTING FROM THE MOSCOW MEETING, HE WONDERED HOW SO MUCH COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IN SO SHORT A TIME.

39. CONCERNING ALLIANCE PUBLIC OPININ, KRAPF NOTED THAT THE EUROPEANS KNEW AND HEARD A GREAT DEAL ABOUT CSCE AND MBFR BUT KNEW LITTLE ABOUT SALT. HE ASKED IF NATO  
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SHOULD NOT DO MORE TO INCREASE POPULAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE, KRAPF NOTED THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT THAT THE MAJOR U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC COMPETITION HAD BEEN STOPPED BY THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THAT STEPS WHICH APPEAR LITTLE NOW WOULD BE CONSIDERED MAJOR IN COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ARMS CONTROL MEASURES.

40. ON MBFR, KRAPF ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN SMALL SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AS A PRELUDE TO FORGETTING MBFR, OR WERE THEY PREPARED TO CONSIDER NON-U.S. FORCES.

41. THE SECRETARY REPEATED THAT NOTHING NEW HAD EMERGED FROM MBFR DISCUSSIONS AT THE SUMMIT. HE SOVIETS HAD RECOGNIZED DIFFERENCES WITH NATO OVER AIR AND ROCKET REDUCTIONS BUT DIDNOT MAKE A SPECIALISSUE OF INDIGENOUS FORCES. THE SECRETARY SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO AVOID HAVING TO MAKE DECISIONS ON MBFR. MOREOVER, THEY SEEMED TO WANT TO AVOID HAVING DISCUSSIONS THAT MIGHT INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT. THEY THEREFORE SEEMED AFRAID TO GIVE ANY AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS THAT MIGHT PUT THEM IN THE NEED OF MAKING FIRM DECISIONS.

42. DE ROSE (FRENCH PERMREP) THANKED THE SECRETARY BOTH FOR HIS REPORT ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND FOR HIS VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY WHICH UNDERLIES SOVIET U.S./WESTERN RELATIONSHIP.

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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6643  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE



INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4207

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACL ANT

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

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EXDIS

43. WITH REGARD TO SALT, DE ROSE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF, LIKE THE U.S. NEGOTIATORS, THE SOVIETS PREDICATE THEIR SALT POSITIONS ON AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES OR ON AN ATTEMPT TO REACH SOME POSSIBLE SUPERIORITY AT A LATER POINT IN TIME. IN LOOKING AT THE SALT I AGREEMENT, DE ROSE FELT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE THAT THAT AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE PROVIDED STABILITY IF MIRVS HAD NOT DEVELOPED. ON THE OTHER HAND THE SOVIETS MIGHT VIEW SALT I AS OPENING A POSSIBILITY FOR SUBSEQUENT SOVIET SUPERIORITY BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF MISSILES PERMITTED THEM IN THE AGREEMENT. IN SUMMARY, DE ROSE WONDERED  
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IF THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THE MAJOR POLITICAL CHOICE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE REAL STABILITY IN THE LONG-TERM AND PERMIT FURTHER, SERIOUS DETENTE MEASURES.

44. DE ROSE ALSO ASKED WHY THE U.S. NO LONGER TALKED ABOUT SSBNS AND THEIR MISSILES. HE WONDERED IF THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE U.S. WOULD NOW TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD LOOK TOWARD FORECLOSING MIRVS ON SOVIET SUBMARINES; OR IS IT THE U.S. POSITION THAT SUCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WOULD NOT PRESENT AS GREAT A PROBLEM AS MIRVED LAND-BASED MISSILES.

45. IN REPLYING TO DE ROSE'S QUESTION ON SOVIET PURPOSES IN SALT, THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR AGAIN THAT SALT I DID NOT GIVE ANY ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIETS. HE REMINDED THAT AT THE TIME OF SALT I, THE U.S. HAD NOT PRODUCED A NEW MISSILE IN SIX YEARS, AND HAD NOT NEW ACTIVE SUBMARINE PROGRAM. HE SAID HE HAD CALLED IN U.S. MILITARY LEADERS TO SEE IF THEY THOUGHT IT NECESSARY FOR THE U.S. TO UNDERTAKE NEW

CRASH SUBMARINE AND/OR MISSILE PROGRAMS. THE MILITARY SERVICES HAD REPLIED THESE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY BUT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIDENT WEAPON SYSTEM. UNDER SALT I, THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED, THE U.S. STOPPED NOTHING THAT IT WAS WORKING ON AND, IN FACT, HAD ACCELERATED WORK ON THE TRIDENT PROGRAM. INDEED, ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE U.S. SPEEDED UP ITS OWN PROGRAMS WHILE SLOWING DOWN THOSE OF THE USSR. SALT I HAD PERMITTED THE U.S. TO MOVE FASTER WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE PERMITTED EXISTING PROGRAMS BUT AT A SLOWER PACE.

46. WITH REGARD TO UNDERLYING SOVIET MOTIVATIONS IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, THE SECRETARY SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY DID NOT HAVE ANY UNIFORM, CLEAR IDEA ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES. FROM HIS TALKS WITH MARSHALL GRECHKO AND WITH SOVIET MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNERS, THE SECRETARY HAD THE IMPRESSIONS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE ANY CLEAR PURPOSE BUT THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY IN A POSITION OF STRATEGIC INFERIORITY TO THE U.S. BY 1981, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT PERCEPTION BUT THAT CANNOT NOW BE PREDICTED WITH ANY ACCURACY. HE NOTED THAT A POSITION HAD NOW DEVELOPED IN WHICH THE MILITARY OF BOTH SIDES FELT THAT THEY WERE FACING EACH OTHER ON A PREMISE OF INFERIORITY--THE SOVIETS CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT INFERIORITY WHILE THEIR U.S.

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COUNTERPARTS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE.

47. THE SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM EVER ACHIEVING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. HE HOPED THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER MAKE THE CHOICE TO ATTEMPT THAT OBJECTIVE. COULD THE SOVIETS BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF THINKING THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY? UNLESS WE LOSE OUR WITS, THIS SHOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NOTHING THE UNITED STATES COULD EVER REALISTICALLY ACCEPT WOULD PERMIT THE BELIEF ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY.

48. THE SECRETARY SAID MUCH DEPENDED ON ONE'S DEFINITION OF SUPERIORITY. ONE DEFINITION WOULD INCLUDE ACTUALLY MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN WHICH ONE SIDE WOULD HAVE DECISIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER. A SURE FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY WOULD BE THE ONLY THING GUARANTEEING SUCH AN ADVANTAGE. THE SECRETARY NOTED ARGUMENTS THAT U.S. MINUTEMAN IIIS MIGHT BECOME INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE. THE SECRETARY SAID IT DOES NOT LOOK THAT WAY TO THE SOVIET MILITARY PLANNER. DESCRIBING THE FORMIDABLE UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN ANY PLANNING FOR A FIRST STRIKE, THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT ACTUALLY THE U.S. COULD GET MORE OUT OF A FIRST-STRIKE SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE T/6 OF THEIR THROW-WEIGHT IN LAND-BASED SILOS WHILE THE U.S. HAD ONE-QUARTER. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS A FACT OF LIFE WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD NOT REMEDY IN TEN YEARS TIME, AND APPARENTLY THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO. THE SECRETARY

RECOGNIZED THAT DE ROSE'S QUESTION WAS A REAL ONE BUT HE  
BELIEVED THE U.S. COULD DEAL WITH IT.

49. WITH REGARD TO MIRVED SOVIETS SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED  
MISSILES, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT SOVIET SYSTEMS ARE INFERIOR TO  
THOSE OF THE U.S. FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAD MORE  
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, FEWER WERE ON STATION AND THEY HAD LESS  
THROW-WEIGHT THAN U.S. SLBMS. THE SECREATRY THOUGHT THE SOVIETS  
COULD NOT DEVELOP A MIRVED SLBM BEFORE THE END OF THE 70'S.  
THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF SUCH A PROGRAM NOR OF TESTING SUCH  
SYSTEMS. GIVEN TIMES REQUIRED FOR TESTING, NO MIRVED SOVIET  
SLBMS COULD BE DEPLOYED BEFORE 1978-80. THE SECRETARY ADDED  
THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT--EVEN FOR THE U.S.--TO THINK OF  
INITIATING AN ATTACK FROM SUBMARINES. SUBMARINES WERE GOOD FOR  
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THEIR SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY AND FOR THEIR FLEXIBILITY NOT  
FOR A FIRST-STRIKE. THEY DO, HOWEVER, ADD TO THE VERIFICATION  
PROBLEM. WHILE VERIFICATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OF MIRVED  
LAND-BASED MISSILES BY OBSERVATION OF SILO MODIFICATIONS  
REQUIRED, THIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DO WITH  
SUBMARINES, EVERY ONE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED  
AS CARRYING MIRVED SLBMS.

50. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THE SECRETARY HAD OBSERVED THAT THE  
SOVIETS APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S. POSITION ON CSCE COMPLE-  
TELY. WHAT THIS TURE FOR THE U.S. POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST? HAVE  
THE SOVIETS EVALUATED THE UNDERSTOOD ARAB ENTHUSIASM FOR THE RETURN  
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST? IS THERE NOT A POSSIBILITY  
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE TEMPTED TO SEEK A COMEBACK AND REGAIN LOST  
GROUND?

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W  
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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6644  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4208  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACL ANT  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USMISSION USUN NY

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51. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND COMPLETELY WHAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO DO IN THE MIDDLE EAST. U.S. ACTIONS AND POLICIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY VISIBLE. THE LATTER ARE NOT, HOWEVER, TO BE EQUATED IN ANY WAY AS BEING PREVIOUSLY COORDINATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PURSUE POLICIES DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE USSR IS NOT, OF COURSE, OVERJOYED WITH OUR RETURN, AND IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REGAIN LOST GROUND. THE U.S., HOWEVER, WILL MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO OBSTRUCT THIS DEVELOPMENT, NOR TO SEEK TO PUSH THE USSR UNNECESSARILY.

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52. FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE ARE TWO WAYS TO HANDLE THE MIDDLE EAST. ONE INVOLVES LUMPING ALL ISSUES TOGETHER, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, THE QUESTION OF ARAB TERRITORIES AND JERUSALEM. THERE IS NO WAY ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH EVEN UNDER U.S. PRESSURE; IF IT WERE PURSUED, ISRAEL WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GO TO WAR. THE U.S. HAD NEVER BEEN EAGER TO FOLLOW THIS APPROACH, WHICH IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY IT HAD A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEANS EARLIER THIS YEAR. THE U.S. VIEW WAS THAT A DIALOGUE WITH ALL THE ARABS TOGETHER WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THIS KIND OF APPROACH WOULD BE GENERATED.

53. THE ONLY OTHER APPROACH IS TO GO STEP BY STEP. THIS IS THE ONLY MANAGEABLE ONE FOR HANDLING THE COMPLEX ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST; THE U.S., THE SECRETARY STRESSED, WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS NOT MANAGEABLE; IF THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS WANT PROGRESS THEY WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. IF THE SOVIETS WANT A GRAND THING OUT OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM THEY CAN ISSUE A DECLARATION BUT THERE WILL BE NO PRACTICAL ACTION. THE U.S. HAS TOLD THEM THIS REPEATEDLY, AND THEY HAVE UNDERSTOOD IT. IF, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WISH TO ADOPT A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, THE U.S. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THEIR PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. DOES NOT OBJECT TO THEIR PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST, NOR DOES IT OBJECT TO ECONOMIC AID BEING PROVIDED BY ANYONE ELSE. THE U.S. STRONGLY

FAVORS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ESPECIALLY TO KEY COUNTRIES. THE SECRET OF U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THAT WE HAVE TOLD EVERYONE THE SAME THING AT ALL TIMES. WE TELL EVERYBODY WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO AND THEN WE DO IT.

54. UNDERSECRETARY RITCHIE (CANADA) SAID HE APPRECIATED KISSINGER'S WILLINGNESS TO CONFER WITH THE ALLIES IN SUCH DETAIL, AND TO PROVIDE THE EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION RESULTING FROM THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. THE LATTER WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EXTENSIVE STUDY IN CAPITALS AND FUTURE NAC DISCUSSIONS. WHILE NOT WISHING TO GO INTO THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES, HE SAID HE DID HAVE ONE QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS WAS A BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, HE SAID HE WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. ONE COULD GAIN THE IMPRESSION FROM THE TREATY THAT UNDERGROUND TESTING UNDER 150 KT IS "GOOD FOR YOU." HE  
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WONDERED ALSO WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE ON THE DISCUSSION ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE IAEA AND ELSEWHERE. DID THE NEW AGREEMENT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN U.S. VIEWS ON THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS? WOULD FURTHER U.S.--USSR DISCUSSIONS BE CONDUCTED ON A BILATERAL OR A BROADER BASIS? SUMMING UP, HE SAID HIS REMARKS COULD BE FORMULATED INTO TWO QUESTIONS. ONE, DOES THE AGREEMENT IMPLY A CHANGE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS; AND TWO, WOULD FUTURE DISCUSSIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3 BE PURELY BILATERAL OR OTHERWISE?

55. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT ON RITCHIE'S OPENING REMARK, THE TREATY WAS NOT SAYING THAT NUCLEAR TESTS BELOW THE 150 KT LEVEL WERE "GOOD FOR YOU," BUT SIMPLY THAT THEY WERE PERMITTED. THERE WERE TWO OBJECTIONS THE U.S. HAD REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. FIRST, THERE WERE NO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AND SECOND, THE SOVIETS HAD WISHED TO INCLUDE A CLAUSE DIRECTED ESSENTIALLY AGAINST FRANCE AND CHINA. SUCH A CLAUSE WOULD HAVE ENABLED THE USSR TO ABROGATE THE TREATY AT ITS DISCRETION IF ANY COUNTRY CONTINUED TO TEST AT ITS OWN TEST SITE. THERE WERE ONLY TWO COUNTRIES TO WHICH THIS APPLIED. HAD THE U.S. SIGNED THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, THUS BECOMING A PARTY TO SUCH A PROVISION, IT WOULD HAVE ENDORSED A FORMULATION WITH BROAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. ASIDE FROM BEING DIRECTED AT OTHERS, SUCH A CLAUSE WAS ALSO ONE-SIDED BECAUSE THE U.S. WOULD BE UNDER MUCH GREATER PRESSURE NOT TO TEST THAN WOULD THE SOVIETS.

56. REGARDING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. IS NOT SO MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT EXPLOSIONS BELOW THE 150 KT LEVEL, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WANT TO KNOW THE LOCATION AND HAVE AVAILABLE THE GEOLOGIC INFORMATION TO INTERPRET THE SIGNALS PROPERLY. FOR EXPLOSIONS ABOVE THE 150 KT LEVEL, VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ARE MUCH MORE STRIDENT. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING AHEAD WITH THE THRESHOLD TREATY UNTIL THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION PROBLEM IS SOLVED. THE U.S. WOULD NOT DEPOSIT ITS

INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION UNTIL THAT MATTER IS SETTLED. AN ATTEMPT TO MULILATERALIZE THE PEACEFUL NECLEAR EXPLOSION DISCUSSIONS COULD MEAN THAT THE THRESHOLD TREATY MIGHT NEVER COME INTO FORCE. THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE MULTILATERALIZED AFTER A SOLUTION HAD BEEN FOUND TO PEADEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE U.S. IS CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING A VERY SERIOUS STUDY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM, SPARKED BY THE INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION,  
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IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WOULD FIGURE. THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THIS STUDY WITH ITS ALLIES.

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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACL ANT  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USMISSION USUN NY

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57. SYG LUNS THEN INVITED THE SECRETARY TO SPEAK ABOUT SPAIN. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE U.S. AND NATO TO BE OF GREAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE. TI IS ALOS IMPORTANT FOR ALL ALLIES TO RECOGNIZE THAT "BIOLOGY" WILL PROVIDE POLITICAL EVOLUTIN IN SPAIN. THIS FACT NEEDS TO

BE TAKEN INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR SPAIN TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES SERIOUSLY TO THE MODALITIES OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. WHILE THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THAT SOME ALLIES CANNOT TAKE SPECIFIC STEPS

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AT THIS TIME FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS, THE NEED FOR CONSIDERING A RELATIONSHIP IN THE FUTURE SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED OR LOST SIGHT OF. THE U.S. IS PURSUING THIS APPROACH AND IS NOW DISCUSSING A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES--SOMEWHAT PARALLEL TO THE NATO DECLARATION--AS A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUING OUR COOPERATION WITH SPAIN. THE U.S. HAD INITIATED THIS EFFORT IN WASHINGTON WITH THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR, AS IS KNOWN TO THE ALLIES. WHAT WILL NOW HAPPEN IS THAT THIS DECLARATION WILL BE INITIALED IN MADRID. SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED THE INTENTION OF INITIATING A DECLARATION, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WHAT HE WAS NOW DOING IS TELLING THE ALLIES WHEN AND WHERE IT WILL TAKE PLACE. HE ADDED THAT WHEN WORK ON THE TEXT IS COMPLETED, IT WOULD BE GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD TO CIRCULATE TO THE COUNCIL.

58. SUMMING UP, LUNS SAID THAT THE SECRETARY HAD GIVEN A FULL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE RECENT BILATERAL U.S./SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW. THE ACCOUNT WAS WELCOMED BY MANY AS A TIMELY AND USEFUL CONSULTATION, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATES TO CSCE. WHILE THERE REMAINED DIFFERENCES AMONG THE ALLIES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CSCE, THEY WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL TO HAVE A "STOCK TAKING" ON WHERE THE ALLIANCE PRESENTLY STANDS. IN ORDER TO UNDERSCORE THE SECRETARY'S DESIRE TO ENHANCE ALLIED SOLIDARITY BY THIS PROPOSAL, HE, LUNS, INTENDS TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR EARLY CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES ON CSCE. FINALLY, HE POINTED TO THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE WHICH THE SECRETARY ATTACHED TO SALT NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED ALLIED SATISFACTION WITH THE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ALLIES HAVE A PROFOUND AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SALT, AND STATED HE AWAITED SUGGESTIONS ON HOW AND IN WHAT FORUM SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. RUMSFELD

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## Message Attributes

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**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 05 JUL 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 23  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** ROME 9313  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <09 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JULY 4 REPORT TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 1974 SUMMIT MEETING  
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**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
MOSCOW  
BUCHAREST  
BUDAPEST  
PRAGUE  
SOFIA



WARSAW  
MADRID  
MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACLANT  
GENEVA  
TOKYO  
USUN NY

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005